[Column] How to Avoid the Pitfalls of Range-Based NDC Targets

The government has finalized the 2035 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to be a 53–61% reduction from 2018 emissions, following a Cabinet meeting on the 11th.Although the numbers appear more ambitious than the 2030 target of 40%, the direction is closer to a step backward. The government defined 53% as the “practical target linked to regulatory instruments such as the Emissions Trading Scheme,” while 61% was described as a “declaratory target premised on expanded support and technological innovation.” The lower bound remains a “practical limit,” and the upper bound remains “rhetorical without commitment.”The government claimed that the NDC reflects a comprehensive consideration of the urgency of the climate crisis, the Constitutional Court’s ruling, IPCC recommendations, and industrial conditions. In reality, however, the decisive factor behind the lower bound was the burden on industry. This is not “balanced consideration” but a political compromise, turning the target into a negotiated outcome rather than a science-based commitment.Last year, the Constitutional Court held that because future generations will bear greater exposure to the impacts of the climate crisis while lacking any voice in today’s democratic decision-making, the government has a heightened duty to design long-term mitigation pathways with utmost care. Therefore, the NDC is not merely declaratory—it is a constitutional obligation. The International Court of Justice also stated this year that a country's discretion in setting its NDC is limited to levels consistent with achieving the 1.5°C goal. Despite this, the government again relied on “industrial conditions” rather than scientific evidence to determine the lower bound, repeating incentives to avoid near-term mitigation obligations mandated by the Constitutional Court.This approach does not benefit industry either. The government’s proposed 2035 reduction rate for the industrial sector is 24.3%, far lower than that of Japan or Germany — countries with similar manufacturing shares. Industry’s argument that “our structure makes it difficult” is essentially a declaration of giving up on technological innovation. Global decarbonization has already shifted into a technology-driven race for industrial transformation. A low reduction target does not reduce short-term risk; instead, it signals the forfeiture of long-term competitiveness and investment opportunities. When the National Assembly legislates the long-term mitigation pathway in the future, it must correct these issues and seriously consider raising the industrial reduction target. The range-type target system creates perverse incentives in administrative practice. To minimize risk, the government and industry will likely plan around the lower bound — the target most achievable. In effect, “53% reduction” becomes the real target, while the upper bound (61%) remains an ornamental figure. This increases the likelihood that the NDC will devolve into a minimum-compliance target, signaling that “only the lower bound needs to be met.”For Korea to achieve real progress through its NDC, fiscal investment and research & development (R&D) plans must be set based on the upper bound, and incentive systems for exceeding targets must be introduced. The structure must shift from “meeting the minimum” to “being rewarded for approaching the upper bound.” This is the beginning of institutional reform that ensures both legal accountability and policy credibility. The 2035 NDC should not be seen as a mere confirmation of targets, but as an opportunity to reset the nation’s climate policy.NDCs can no longer remain within the realm of climate and environmental policy. Climate policy must serve as a platform for technological innovation, industrial transformation, and new market creation. A collaborative planning process between the public and private sectors and a performance-linked institutional design are essential. Korea needs a system in which constitutional responsibility, international expectations, and market signals work together.What is needed now is not adjusting numbers but restoring institutional integrity and accountability. A lower-bound NDC cannot meet the 1.5°C goal, sustain industrial competitiveness, or create new opportunities for growth. The government must step out of its political comfort zone and return to the science- and constitution-based obligations. That is the only way for Korea to remain competitive amid global transition. 

In the Era of Climate Crisis, An Unforeseen Disaster Called Flash Drought

Flash droughts are an emerging type of drought that has newly emerged as climate change intensifies hydrologic extremes. Within days to weeks, they can rapidly deplete water resources due to a combination of precipitation deficits and high temperatures that increase evapotranspiration. --> HIGHLIGHTS : Flash droughts are already occurring in South Korea, with a marked rise in heatwave-induced flash droughts during summer. Their impact goes beyond agriculture, affecting municipal water supplies as well. However, the conventional drought definition emphasizes a slow-onset, long-duration phenomenon. This leaves flash droughts largely invisible within existing early warning, monitoring, and response systems. As a result, South Korea's current monthly drought statistics and warning systems often fail to detect them, even when real-world damage is occurring during officially ‘drought-free’ periods. Due to their ability to rapidly exhaust water resources, flash droughts pose a major threat to sustainable water management. Addressing them requires a new operational definition. We also need high-temperature-based indices and integration of weekly forecasts into drought monitoring, statistics, and response frameworks. --> document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function() { document.title = "NEXT group | In the Era of Climate Crisis, An Unforeseen Disaster Called Flash Drought"; document.querySelector('meta[property="og:title"]').setAttribute("content", "NEXT group | In the Era of Climate Crisis, An Unforeseen Disaster Called Flash Drought"); let metaDescription = document.querySelector('meta[name="description"]'); if (!metaDescription) { metaDescription = document.createElement("meta"); metaDescription.name = "description"; document.head.appendChild(metaDescription); } metaDescription.setAttribute("content", "Flash droughts are an emerging type of drought that has newly emerged as climate change intensifies hydrologic extremes. Within days to weeks, they can rapidly deplete water resources due to a combination of precipitation deficits and high temperatures that increase evapotranspiration."); });

Offshore grid governance: a prerequisite for timely offshore wind deployment

South Korea, which is still in the early stages of offshore wind power deployment, has yet to establish a clear offshore grid governance system. This issue brief examines the current situation in Korea and international case studies, emphasizing the need for Korea to establish a well-defined offshore grid governance framework. --> HIGHLIGHTS : The expansion of offshore wind power is increasing the importance of offshore grids in transmitting power to land. However, Korea lacks clear offshore grid governance, complicating efficient design and operation. The main models of offshore grid governance include transmission system operator (TSO)-led, generator-led, and third-party (OFTO)-led models, which differ in terms of who builds the grid, who pays for it, and how efficient it is. The UK emphasizes competition through an OFTO-led model, while Germany and Denmark have adopted a TSO-led model to realize economies of scale. South Korea needs to improve the cost burden structure of offshore grids and proactively establish a clear governance system to support the introduction of meshed offshore grids and their efficient deployment. --> document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function() { document.title = "NEXT group | Offshore grid governance: a prerequisite for timely offshore wind deployment"; document.querySelector('meta[property="og:title"]').setAttribute("content", "NEXT group | Offshore grid governance: a prerequisite for timely offshore wind deployment"); let metaDescription = document.querySelector('meta[name="description"]'); if (!metaDescription) { metaDescription = document.createElement("meta"); metaDescription.name = "description"; document.head.appendChild(metaDescription); } metaDescription.setAttribute("content", "South Korea, which is still in the early stages of offshore wind power deployment, has yet to establish a clear offshore grid governance system. This issue brief examines the current situation in Korea and international case studies, emphasizing the need for Korea to establish a well-defined offshore grid governance framework."); });

Myopic Government Policy for Petchem in Peril: Shortcomings and Solutions

This Issue Brief points out the shortcomings of the policy to raise the competitiveness of the country’s petrochemical industry announced by the government on December 23, 2024, and suggests directions for improvement. 주요 내용 --> On December 23, 2024, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) of South Korea announced a policy to raise the competitiveness of the country’s petrochemical industry. The announcement primarily envisions ① rationalizing surplus naphtha cracking facilities, ② strengthening the sector’s global competitiveness, and ③ transitioning to high-value-added specialty products and ecofriendly products. However, the policy seems to fall far short of rescuing the industry in several respects—its lukewarm restructuring plan, the focus of new investment support placed on merely keeping the sinking industry afloat, and the prolonged absence of effective research and development (R&D) plans. The operating rate of naphtha cracking facilities has slumped to around 70-percent range. If it is to rebound to 90 percent or above, one-third of the current naphtha cracking facilities must be retired by 2030. With the looming risk of missing the golden hour for restructuring the industry while business conditions rapidly deteriorate, the Fair Trade Act needs to loosen its grip to facilitate M&A, government-led big deals. The government, hand in hand with the Daesan Industrial Complex, is contemplating the construction of an ethane terminal and an ethane cracker. However, a colossal investment against the global race to carbon neutrality portends high risk, especially given the uncertainty surrounding South Korea’s price advantages over China and the Middle East. There has been almost no discussion of key technologies required for transitioning the petrochemical industry. The petrochemical industry’s 2025-2030 R&D investment roadmap, slated to be released in the first half of 2025, must prioritize decarbonization technologies such as electrically heated furnaces, methane pyrolysis-driven hydrogen production, and heat pumps. Keeping the industry afloat as it is not the answer. There is no time to lose. South Korea’s petrochemical sector must be frogmarched through transformation, even if the hour is already late. The government is urged to take decisive action with a clear vision. ※ 관련 보고서 --> * This Issue Brief can be better understood in depth when read alongside A Net Zero Roadmap for South Korea’s Petrochemical Industry>, published in November 2024. --> --> document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function() { document.title = "NEXT group | Myopic Government Policy for Petchem in Peril: Shortcomings and Solutions"; document.querySelector('meta[property="og:title"]').setAttribute("content", "NEXT group | Myopic Government Policy for Petchem in Peril: Shortcomings and Solutions"); let metaDescription = document.querySelector('meta[name="description"]'); if (!metaDescription) { metaDescription = document.createElement("meta"); metaDescription.name = "description"; document.head.appendChild(metaDescription); } metaDescription.setAttribute("content", "This Issue Brief points out the shortcomings of the policy to raise the competitiveness of the country’s petrochemical industry announced by the government on December 23, 2024, and suggests directions for improvement. "); });

Analysis of heavy snowfall damage and the need for new statistics as winter weather changes

Heavy snowfall damage primarily affects greenhouses and barns, which are structurally vulnerable to snow. These facilities often suffer more damage from heavy snowfall than from typhoons or heavy rains.Indirect damage, such as traffic congestion, flight and ferry cancellations, and power outages, is not currently included in disaster statistics. This omission risks underestimating the true impact of heavy snowfall.Recent climate change has led to rising winter temperatures in Korea, increasing winter precipitation. While this may result in more heavy snowfall events, precipitation may also shift from snow to rain, potentially causing heavy rainfall instead.Current disaster statistics fail to account for combined damages from atypical winter disasters, such as torrential rains and abnormally high temperatures.Estimating the overall damage caused by climate change is crucial for designing a sustainable future. New and systematic statistical standards are needed to capture both indirect damages from typical disasters and atypical damages.

Solving curtailment issues, starting with data transparency

HIGHLIGHTSRenewable energy curtailments were first implemented on Jeju Island in 2015 and have since been occurring on the mainland starting in 2021. However, it is difficult to locate documentation that clearly explains the specific reasons for these regional curtailments.The causes of curtailment can be categorized into oversupply, transmission constraints, lack of reserve power, lack of inertia, and inadequate inverter function, primarily occurring in the Jeju and Honam regions. Curtailment in Jeju is primarily due to a lack of inertia, while in Honam, it is mainly attributed to inadequate inverter function and transmission constraints.Curtailment increases uncertainty for operators of solar and wind energy, thereby impeding the penetration of renewable energy. To reduce this uncertainty, it is essential to have transparent data disclosure regarding curtailment. However, South Korea has not yet achieved transparency in disclosing the source, location, and amount of curtailment.This issue brief aims to clarify the concept of curtailment for non-power system professionals by analyzing the various causes of curtailment in Korea and introducing examples of curtailment policies and data disclosure from other countries. Based on these analyses, we recommend that transparent data disclosure and clear curtailment policies be established as prerequisites for mitigating curtailment and promoting renewable energy.KEY WORDS Curtailment, power grid, solar, wind, data transparency 

It's time for a paradigm shift: the real typhoon damage starts in the fall

HIGHLIGHTS      In the last decade, typhoons have been the second most destructive type of natural disaster. We need to focus on typhoons, particularly those that occur during the fall, as their intensity is anticipated to rise due to climate change.   While summer typhoons (June-August) account for fewer than half (47%) of all domestic-impact typhoons over the past 20 years, fall typhoons (September-October) represent approximately 75%, equating to three out of every four typhoons that result in actual property damage. Additionally, fall typhoons are responsible for about 95% of all typhoon damage recovery costs in the past decade.   Typhoons occurring in the fall often result in significant damage that necessitates extensive repairs, particularly to utilities, and typically cause more destruction than those in the summer. The recovery costs for fall typhoons are 2.4 times higher than those for summer typhoons, even though the property damage is only 1.5 times greater.    The differences in damage between fall and summer typhoons can be attributed to differences in typhoon characteristics, such as intensity. More importantly, the paths of typhoons play a key role in amount of damage. Fall typhoons most commonly affect regions with numerous public facilities, which likely accounts for the observed damage to these facilities.   Finally, the onset of property damage from typhoons has been delayed by approximately three weeks over the past 20 years and may be further delayed in the future. Therefore, we must shift from the traditional view that "typhoons are a summer phenomenon" to a recognition that "typhoons are a fall phenomenon." It is crucial to acknowledge that, due to climate change, there is no longer a "safe" time to prepare for natural disasters. Instead, we need to maintain a state of readiness throughout the year.

The role of Special Bill on Offshore Wind Power in expanding offshore wind deployment

HIGHLIGHTS• Scaling up offshore wind deployment is essential for decarbonizing the transition sector, but the absence of a state-led system has resulted in numerous inefficiencies.• A proposed bill aims to shift from the current open-door system to a streamlined one-stop shop approach in planned sites, still pending in the National Assembly despite three years of discussion.• Key factors influencing offshore wind penetration in Korea include 1) permitting and local acceptance, 2) power grid, 3) offshore wind market, 4) ports and installation vessels, and 5) the supply chain. Among these, the first three factors are primary drivers, and uncertainties surrounding them must be addressed to enhance development and investment in the remaining areas.• The current special bill addresses permitting and local acceptance but could be improved in terms of power grid and the offshore wind market.• In the transitional measures of the special bill, it is desirable to ensure to allow existing developers to continue their projects under the current legal framework, while applying the new scheme exclusively to new entrants.• Besides passing the special bill, the government should reduce policy uncertainty by releasing a comprehensive Master Plan for Onshore and Offshore Transmission Systems, a strategy for building an efficient national grid, and an Offshore Wind Auction Roadmap detailing the location, frequency, and scale of auctions over the coming years.• Considering that the accelerated development of existing developers is crucial for meeting the 2030 offshore wind installation target, the government should pre-disclose the bid volume for each competitive bidding round in the coming years and support the permitting process.

The Gangnam Flood: Where Are We?

HIGHLIGHTS    Over the past decade in Korea, flooding due to heavy rainfall has been responsible for the majority of natural disaster damages. With climate change expected to intensify these rainfall events, there is a pressing need to implement measures to reduce flood damage. Specifically, the Gangnam Station area in Seoul experienced severe flooding in 2022, yet effective policy and physical measures to combat such flooding remain insufficient.    The '1st Han River Basin Water Management Comprehensive Plan' was recently introduced as a policy measure. Additionally, the Urban Flood Prevention Act has entered enforcement, accompanied by a 10-year basic and implementation plan for urban flood measures. As a physical countermeasure, plans are underway to construct a deep underground rainwater tunnel in the Gangnam Station area.    However, policy measures currently do not adequately support physical measures, and the options for physical measures are constrained by the lack of clear alternatives to the deep underground rainwater tunnel. Additionally, there is no established legal framework for the installation, operation, and management of the rainwater tunnel. A related legislative proposal, titled the “Deep Underground Special Act (tentative title),” is still under review by a subcommittee of the National Assembly. Moreover, the completion of the deep underground rainwater tunnel, originally scheduled for 2027, has been delayed until 2029 due to administrative procedures and project bidding processes. Despite these delays, concerns about environmental pollution and cost inefficiency persist, yet no viable alternatives have been proposed.    In this issue brief, we recommend the following actions: 1) the Ministry of Environment should expedite the development of a 10-year master plan for reducing flood damage; 2) the National Assembly should initiate discussions on a bill aimed at strengthening policy support for the rainwater tunnel; and 3) the Seoul Metropolitan Government must highlight the importance of developing alternatives to the rainwater tunnel to manage heavy rainfall.

Impending U.S. Carbon Tariffs

HIGHLIGHTS  • The U.S. Senate introduced the Foreign Pollution Fee (FPF) Act in November 2023, one of the U.S. multiple attempts to implement trade regulations imposing a tariff on carbon emissions of imported goods.  • The FPF, proposed by Republican Senator Bill Cassidy, advocates for a tariff rate proportional to the disparity in carbon intensity between goods produced in a foreign country and the U.S. The goal is to restrict imports to no more than 50% greater carbon intensity than the U.S.  • Korean-manufactured steel flat products are expected to be 65 to 69 percent more carbon-intensive than their U.S. counterparts, making it challenging for Korean steelmakers to avoid tariffs as the difference exceeds 50%. The FPF allows exceptional tariff exemptions or reductions through international partnerships or Free Trade Agreements within this 50% margin.  • This suggests that the introduction of emissions-associated trade regulations, just like the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), is imminent in the U.S. Against this backdrop, hydrogen reduction steelmaking, a focus of the Korean government and steelmakers and expected to be commercialized after 2030, is insufficient for a short-term solution.  • To secure the steel export market, a quick promotion of low-carbon technologies, such as using coke oven gas (COG) in blast furnaces to replace cokes partially and increasing inputs of scraps and direct reduced iron (DRI) in basic oxygen furnaces, is necessary in the short and medium term.  • The government should ease the industry burden by supporting the procurement of scrap and DRI, the key materials essential in the short and medium-term decarbonization process, and decarbonizing the national grid.